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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DONETTA 1. KAFADER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 















Docket No. 39195-2011 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District County of Twin Falls 
The Honorable Randy J. Stoker District Judge Presiding 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
F or the Appellant 
Michael E. Kelly 
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC 
413 West Idaho Street, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701 
For the Respondent 
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REPL Y ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion. 
The questions presented on appeal are simple; did Judge Stoker conduct an independent 
evaluation and weigh all of the evidence, and then determine what the trial court would have 
awarded as damages when deciding the motions for new trial; and ifhe did not, was there legal 
authority for not so doing? The answer to the first question is a resounding "no." Judge Stoker 
stated unequivocally that he had deferred to the jury and did not weigh the credibility or 
testimony of the expert witnesses. 
The answer to the second question is also "no." Neither Judge Stoker in his opinion, nor 
the Respondent in her brief, cited to legal authority directing the trial court to afford deference to 
the jury related to the evaluation of the credibility and testimony of expert witnesses, or any 
evidence for that matter. 
If the applicable standard, applying either Rule 59(a)(5) or 59(a)(6), requires the trial 
judge to independently weigh all of the evidence, and the trial judge specifies that he is not 
considering or weighing the testimony of any of the expert witnesses when deciding post-trial 
motions, and further that he was deferring to what the trial court assumed the jury had concluded 
regarding the testimony of the expert witnesses, then how has the trial court applied the requisite 
standard when considering post-trial motions for additur and new trial? "Thus, to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must assess whether it properly examined the 
relationship between its own findings of fact and the jury verdict through the unique lenses of 
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Rule 59(a)(5) and 59(a)(6)." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., p. 12, Supreme Court Doc. No 37026 
(2012). (Emphasis added.) 
If the trial judge must determine what he would have awarded, based on his own 
independent evaluation of the evidence, and the trial court acknowledges that he has not 
considered the credibility or testimony ofthe medical expert witnesses, then how could the trial 
court have determined what he believed was the proper amount of damages? 
On appeal, if the reviewing court must "assess whether it [the trial court] properly 
examined the relationship between its own findings of fact and the jury verdict through the 
unique lenses of Rule 59(a)(5) and 59(a)(6), how can the reviewing court provide any 
meaningful review if the trial court has not made the requisite "findings of fact" related to all of 
the evidence? 
By failing to follow the requisite standards; which require the trial court to conduct its 
own independent evaluation of the evidence and to determine what it would have awarded in 
damages, Judge Stoker abused his discretion when denying Mrs. Kafader's post-trial motions. 
2. Dr. Hammond Conceded Nothing. 
Mrs. Kafader will stand by her contention in her Appellant's Brief when she argued, " ... , 
the Defendant failed to provide a single medical record that established or corroborated either an 
accurate diagnosis of fibromyalgia or any ongoing treatment for this "syndrome" at any point 
relative to the 2008 collision as Dr, Knoebel claimed." Dr. Hammond did acknowledge he stated 
in a single chart note he was prescribing medication for the "fibromyalgia aspect," or for "pain," 
but he ultimately determined, after having treated Mrs. Kafader for over two years and after 
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having conducted thirteen evaluations over that time period, Mrs. Kafader's cervical pain was 
not caused by any alleged fibromyalgia syndrome, but by a muscle spasm that he and Dr. Turner 
had observed and documented for over two years. (Tr., p 188, L. 18 to p. 189, L. 10.) Contrary 
to the Respondent's contention, Dr. Hammond conceded nothing. 
Imagine the situation where Dr. Knoebel was actually practicing medicine and was truly 
trying to diagnose Mrs. Kafader's injuries, perhaps he would have contacted Dr. Hammond and 
inquired about the single entry over the course of over two years, when that Dr. Hammond used 
the word "fibromyalgia." Dr. Hammond's reply would have been commensurate with this 
testimony; first, that had considered and subsequently ruled out fibromyalgia, and second, he did 
use the word once, which he considered synonymous for pain. Ultimately, Dr. Hammond was 
unequivocal in his testimony that he had ruled out fibromyalgia, and his and Dr. Turner's 
documented observation of objective symptoms in Mrs. Kafader's neck corroborated that 
conclusion. 
The bottom line is Dr. Knoebel could have cared less what was in Dr. Hammond's 
medical records as evidenced by his less than two-minute review during the end of his video 
deposition required because Dr. Knoebel refused to attend the trial. Even Mrs. Baumann's 
Counsel was surprised by Dr. Knoebel's cursory review and inquired whether Dr. Knoebel 
needed more time. (Supp. Tr., p. 39, L. 6-22.) 
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3. The Deference To Which The Jury Is Entitled Is Related Ultimately To Its Damage 
Award, Not When Evaluating Any Evidence. 
In Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 903 P.2d 110 (Idaho App., 1995), the Court, citing to 
Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 625, 603 P.2d 575, 580 (1979), discusses a trial court's duty 
to "defer" to the jury's damage award, "unless it is apparently to the trial judge there is a great 
disparity between the two damage awards and that disparity cannot be explained away as simply 
the product of two separate entities valuing the proof of the plaintiff's injuries in two equally fair 
ways." Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 903 P.2d 110, 125-26 (Idaho App., 1995). 
Contrary to the Respondent's contention, the "great disparity" standard only applies after 
the trial judge has weighed all of the evidence, made its own independent assessment of all of the 
evidence, and determined what the court would have awarded in damages. In this case, however, 
the trial court stated it was deferring to the jury's evaluation of the medical testimony, not the 
jury's resulting damage award. "The credibility of the doctors' opinions is truly a matter for jury 
determination." (R., p. 339.) 
Judge Stoker, although claiming he had "weighed the evidence in this case ... ", concludes 
with the qualification, "given the finding that the cervical injury was not permanent." (R., p. 
340.) As stated clearly and earlier in his decision, Judge Stoker was deferring to the jury when 
evaluating the medical expert testimony, and as the issue of the permanency of Mrs. Kafader's 
injury was addresses solely by the medical expert testimony, the only logical conclusion is Judge 
Stoker did not independently determine whether Mrs. Kafader had sustained a permanent injury, 
but was speculating as to what the jury may have determined viewing the evidence from the 
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jury's perspective. While the Respondent argues Judge Stoker had weighed all of the evidence, 
his stated and clear qualification; "given the finding that the cervical injury was not permanent," 
when considered with Judge Stoker's disclosure he was deferring to the jury regarding the 
medical expert testimony, proves otherwise. 
If the amount the trial court would have awarded, based on an independent evaluation of 
all of the evidence, including the expert testimony, is different from what the jury awarded, then 
the court must defer to the jury's finding unless tht::re is great disparity. However, that deference 
applies only after the court has reached its own conciusion, having afforded no deference to the 
jury related to the evaluation of any of the evidence. 
4. Attorney Fees. 
Rather than address and argue whether Judge Stoker's disclosure that he had not 
independently evaluated the medical expert evidence was appropriate, the Respondent simply 
ignores this fact. Consequently, if Judge Stoker was required to independently assess and 
evaluate all of the evidence, including the expert testimony, to determine what the trial court 
would have awarded, and then to compare those figures when deciding the post-trial motions; the 
standard the Respondent does not dispute, then how is the Respondent's defense on appeal other 
than anything but frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation in light of Judge Stoker's 
disclosure he was deferring to the jury and had not independently evaluated the medical 
testimony? 
Once again, Mrs. Kafader seeks attorney fees on appeal according to Idaho Code § 12-
121. "Attorney fees under § 12-121 will be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal when this 
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Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Adler v. Abolafia, p. 10, Supreme Court Doc. 
No. 38189 (2010), quoting Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526,533,66 PJd 230,237 (2003). 
CONCLUSION 
As the record is clear that Judge Stoker did not independently evaluate the credibility or 
testimony of the medical expert witnesses, and the legal standard is equally clear that a trial court 
deciding the post-trial motions presented below is not authorized to defer to the jury when 
independently evaluating all of the evidence, once again Mrs. Kafader respectfully requests that 
the appellate court remand this case to the district court with direction the district court conduct 
its own evaluation of the evidence and weigh the credibility of the medical expert witnesses 
when deciding Mrs. Kafader's Motion for Additur and in the alternative New Trial. 
As Mrs. Kafader believes there was no credible evidence to support any conclusion she 
had not suffered a permanent cervical injury, Mrs. Kafader asks the appellate court, in the 
alternative, to remand the case with direction to the district court to grant Mrs. Kafader's motion 
for Additur or New Trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of June, 2012. 
TES, ATTORNEYS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of June, 2012, I served the foregoing, by 
having a true and complete copy delivered via hand delivery to: 
Michael E. Kelly 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 West Idaho Street, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Eric R. Clark 
